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Honorable Jane A. Restani, Judge of the United States
Court of International Trade, sitting by designation.
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RESTANI, Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellant Joseph Brown appeals the
Commissioner of the Social Security Administration’s (“the
Commissioner”) denial of his application for supplemental
security income (“SSI”). For the following reasons, we will
affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL
HISTORY
In March 2006, Joseph Brown, a fifty-one year old man
with a history of violent crime and drug abuse, applied for SSI
under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. ' 1381 et
seq. Despite alleging a disability beginning in April 2002 due to
bipolar disorder and anxiety, his application was initially denied
in October 2006 because his “condition [was] not severe enough
to keep [him] from working.” Admin. R. 109. Upon Brown’s
request, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge
(“ALJ”) in February 2008 (“the hearing”). At the conclusion of
the hearing, the ALJ determined that Brown was not disabled
because he “has been capable of making a successful adjustment
to other work that exists in significant numbers in the national
economy.” App. to Br. of Appellant A10. Brown then filed an
appeal with the appeals council, but the administrative appeals
judge concluded that there was “no reason . . . to review the
[ALJ=s] decision.” Admin. R. 1.
In May 2009, Brown filed this lawsuit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. In
a report and recommendation, the Magistrate Judge concluded
that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence
and recommended that Brown’s request for review be denied.
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The District Court reviewed the issues raised by Brown’s
objections, and adopted the Magistrate Judge’s report and
recommendation, concluding that the ALJ’s decision was indeed
supported by substantial evidence. Brown now appeals.
JURISDICTION AND APPELLATE STANDARD OF
REVIEW
The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C.
' 405(g). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. ' 1291. “[O]ur
review of the ALJ’s decision is more deferential as we
determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the
decision of the Commissioner.” Knepp v. Apfel, 204 F.3d 78, 83
(3d Cir. 2000).
DISCUSSION
We begin by addressing in some detail the standard of
review a district court should apply when reviewing a magistrate
judge’s findings in an SSI claim.
A district court may “designate a magistrate judge to
conduct hearings, including evidentiary hearings, and to submit
to a judge of the court proposed findings of fact and
recommendations for the disposition” of certain matters pending
before the court. 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1)(b). In such cases, “the
magistrate judge shall file his proposed findings and
recommendations. . . with the court and a copy shall forthwith
be mailed to all parties.” Id. ' 636(b)(1)(c). “Within fourteen
days after being served with a copy, any party may serve and file
written objections to such proposed findings and
recommendations as provided by rules of court.” Id. ' 636(b)(1).
If a party timely and properly files such a written objection, the
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District Court “shall make a de novo determination of those
portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made.” Id. (emphasis
added). We have provided that ' 636(b)(1) requires district
courts to review such objections de novo unless the objection is
“not timely or not specific.” Goney v. Clark, 749 F.2d 5, 6-7 (3d
Cir. 1984) (citation omitted).
The District Court misapplied that framework to this
case. Brown timely filed written objections challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence upon which the Magistrate Judge’s
findings rested. In considering these objections, the District
Court stated that “objections which merely rehash arguments
presented to and considered by a magistrate judge are not
entitled to de novo review.” Morgan v. Astrue, No. 08-2133,
2009 WL 3541001, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 30, 2009). That is not
correct; any appeal to a district court based on an objection to a
Magistrate Judge’s order will “rehash arguments presented to
and considered by” the Magistrate Judge. That is—by
definition—the very nature of “review.” In SSI appeals, the
plain language of ' 636(b)(1) and our ruling in Goney, make
clear that the standard district courts should apply to such
objections is de novo. The District Court’s articulation of the
standard of review was therefore erroneous.
The error, however, was harmless. An error is “harmless”
when, despite the technical correctness of an appellant=s legal
contention, there is also “no set of facts” upon which the
appellant could recover. Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315,
341 (3d Cir. 2010). In this case, the rulings by the Magistrate
Judge to which Brown objected were based upon facts found by
the ALJ. Under 42 U.S.C. ' 405(g), “[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by
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substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” Upon Brown=s
appeal from the ALJ’s finding, the task of the Magistrate Judge
was thus to determine whether the ALJ’s ruling was “supported
by substantial evidence.” Id. And, upon Brown’s appeal from
the Magistrate Judge’s rulings, the task of the District Court was
to determine—de novo—whether the Magistrate Judge reached
the correct conclusion. 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1). Upon review of
the record, we conclude that although the District Court stated
that Brown’s objections were “not entitled to de novo review,” it
also did consider whether each of the rulings from which Brown
appeals were supported by substantial evidence. Because, as set
forth below, the District Court correctly found that substantial
evidence supported the ALJ=s findings, those findings were
“conclusive,” 28 U.S.C. ' 636(b)(1), and bound the District
Court, Hartranft v. Apfel, 181 F.3d 358, 360 (3d Cir. 1999)
(“We will not set the Commissioner=s decision aside if it is
supported by substantial evidence, even if we would have
decided the factual inquiry differently.”) (citing 42 U.S.C.
' 405(g), and Monsour Medical Ctr. v. Heckler, 806 F.2d 1185,
1190-1191 (3d. Cir.1986)). Having found “substantial evidence”
for the ALJ=s findings, there was “no set of facts” upon which
the District Court could find in Brown=s favor. Renchenski, 622
F.3d at 341.
I.

The ALJ=s Determination
A.

The Weight Afforded to Brown=s Treating
Psychiatrist’s Opinion

Brown claims that the ALJ’s decision to not adopt the
opinion of his treating psychiatrist was not supported by
substantial evidence. This claim lacks merit.

6

The ALJ determined that Brown did not qualify for SSI
after finding that he was capable of performing simple, routine
work despite his disability. Dr. Richard Cohen, a medical expert
who testified at the hearing, concluded that Brown retained the
capacity to perform “simple repetitive tasks.” App. to Br. of
Appellant A19. The ALJ explained that Cohen’s conclusion was
supported by record evidence from Alex Siegel, Ph.D., a state
agency disability consultant, who advised that Brown “is able to
meet the basic mental demands of competitive work on a
sustained basis despite the limitations resulting from his
impairments.” Admin. R. 272; see App. to Br. of Appellant A8.
Although there was record evidence from a treating psychiatrist
suggesting a contrary conclusion, 1 the ALJ is entitled to weigh
all evidence in making its finding. See Kertesz v. Crescent Hills
Coal Co., 788 F.2d 158, 163 (3d Cir. 1986) (providing that an
“ALJ is not bound to accept the opinion or theory of any
medical expert, but may weigh the medical evidence and draw
its own inferences”). As the ALJ clearly explained why she gave
greater weight to the opinion of Dr. Cohen, her decision was
supported by substantial evidence and was not contrary to law. 2
1

Dr. Jesus Herrera, the treating psychiatrist who saw
Brown four times, stated that if Brown were to work, he would
miss “12 days to 15 days” of work a month due to his mental
impairment.
2

Brown argues that an ALJ may not disregard the
opinion of a treating physician. The law is clear, however, that
the opinion of a treating physician does not bind the ALJ on the
issue of functional capacity. See Adorno v. Shalala, 40 F.3d 43,
47-48 (3d Cir. 1994) (providing that “a statement by a plaintiff’s
treating physician supporting an assertion that [plaintiff] is
disabled or unable to work is not dispositive of the issue”
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See Morales v. Apfel, 225 F.3d 310, 317 (3d Cir. 2000)
(providing that if “the opinion of a treating physician conflicts
with that of a non-treating, non-examining physician, the ALJ
may choose whom to credit but cannot reject evidence for no
reason or for the wrong reason” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Jones v. Sullivan, 954 F.2d 125, 129 (3d Cir. 1991)
(providing that an ALJ may disregard the opinion of a treating
physician if “two physicians in the state agency evaluated the
medical findings . . . and concluded that those findings did not
reveal any condition that would preclude gainful employment”).
Accordingly, the District Court did not err when it affirmed the
Commissioner’s decision in this regard.
B.

Brown=s Functional Capacity

Next, Brown contends that the ALJ’s finding as to the
credibility of his claimed limitations is not supported by
substantial evidence. This claim also lacks merit.
An ALJ must give “subjective complaints >serious
consideration,’ . . . and ma[k]e specific findings of fact,
including credibility, as to [a plaintiff’s] residual functional
capacity.” Burns v. Barnhart, 312 F.3d 113, 129 (3d Cir. 2002)
(citation omitted). The ALJ ultimately determined that, contrary
to Brown’s claim, he was not disabled. As previously discussed,
the ALJ relied on Dr. Cohen’s assessment that Brown could
work. In further support of this conclusion, the ALJ cited record
evidence that Brown had a good relationship with his girlfriend,
liked to fix things around the house, was skilled at carpentry,
and had not recently been involved in physical altercations.
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
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Medical notes on the record also indicate that Brown’s “physical
appearance was appropriate,” his “[m]emory was good; insight
and judgment were fair,” his “[m]otor activity was normal and
speech was articulated,” his “[a]ttitude was polite and behavior
was cooperative,” and that his “eye contact was good.” Admin.
R. 238. The ALJ’s finding as to Brown=s functional capacity,
therefore, was supported by substantial evidence. Cf. Plummer
v. Apfel, 186 F.3d 422, 427 (3d Cir. 1999) (providing that
“[s]ubstantial evidence . . . means such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Accordingly, the District Court did not err
when it affirmed the Commissioner’s determination in this
regard.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, any error in the District
Court’s articulation of the standard of review was harmless, and
the District Court was correct to find that the Commissioner’s
determination was supported by substantial evidence.
Accordingly, the District Court’s order granting judgment to the
defendant will be affirmed.
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